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I. INTRODUCTION
In the coming years, South America faces monumental developmen-
tal change. Land that now contains first-growth tropical forests, healthy
rivers, and private homes is slated to be destroyed and replaced with
dams, highways, and waterway transit channels. Propelling this change
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2007; A.B., Duke University, 2001.
Glenn Switkes of the International Rivers Network deserves my sincere gratitude for his in-
sight into the implications of the Rio Madeira projects and for his guidance and patience as I
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are 335 projects centered on transportation, energy, and telecommunica-
tions, thrown together under one multilateral umbrella.' Dubbed the
Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America
(IIRSA), this megaproject groups the twelve countries of South America
into eight regional "hubs."2 Each hub contains numerous individual in-
frastructure projects designed to transform the region by "[overcoming]
formidable natural barriers like the Andes Mountains, the Amazon Rain-
forest, and the Orinoco river basin."3 The overall economic objective of
these projects is to "foster the integration and development of [these]
isolated sub-regions."
4
Promotion and funding for these projects has occurred at the macro-
level,5 while planning-other than from a purely business perspective -
1. See Building Informed Civic Engagement for Conservation in the Andes-Amazon
[BICECA], About IIRSA, http://www.biceca.org//en/Page.About.Iirsa.aspx.
2. IIRSA, What are the prospects of URSA's work?, http://www.iirsa.org/
BancoConocimiento/F/fm..que-orientaciontienen los trabajos/fm que.orientaciontienen-I
osjtrabajos-ENG.asp?Codldioma=ENG.
In agreement with the region's geo-economic vision, the South American territory
is organized into multinational strips that concentrate current and potential trade
flows, and where an attempt is being made to establish a common minimum stan-
dard for infrastructure service quality in transport, energy and telecommunications
to support specific productive activities in each Integration and Development Hub
or strip.
Id.
3. ELISANGELA SOLDATELLI PALM, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH BRAZIL, IIRSA: t ESTA A
INTEGRA 'AO QUE N6S QUEREMOS? [IRSA: Is THIS THE INTEGRATION THAT WE WANT?] 4
(2003), available at http://www.natbrasil.org.br/Docs/instituicoes-financeiras/iirsa%202003. pdf
(quoting INTER-AM. DEV. BANK [IDB], A NEW PUSH FOR REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVEL-
OPMENT IN SOUTH AMERICA 33 (2000), available at http://www.iadb.org/intallaplicacionesl
uploads/publicaciones/i_INTALITD IE 2000_infrastructure idb.pdf) (author's translation). See
also RAUL ZIBECHI, INT'L RELATIONS CTR. AMERICAS PROGRAM, SPECIAL REPORT: IIRSA-
INTEGRATION CUSTOM-MADE FOR INTERNATIONAL MARKETS (2006), http://ameficas.irc-
online.org/pdf/reports/0606iirsa.pdf; M.A. Arantes Porto et al., FURNAS Centrais Eldtricas
S.A., The Madeira Hydro Complex: Regional Integration and Environmental Sustainability,
INT'L J. HYDROPOWER & DAMS, Issue Two, 2006, at 3 [hereinafter FURNAS] ("To avoid any
interference with the existing navigation way, locks are being provided at each powerplant,...
as the presence of the reservoirs will eliminate natural obstacles which in the past have caused
problems for navigation."); id. at 6 ("Environmental awareness and sensitivity combined with
technical responsibility can provide innovative solutions to reduce environmental impacts
making it possible to extend development to regions where 'nature rules.' ").
4. IIRSA, When Was it Created?, http://www.iirsa.org/BancoConocimiento/F/fm-
cuando-nacio/fm cuandonacioENG.asp?Codldioma=ENG.
5. See FURNAS, Negocios, Novos Projetos, http:l/www.furnas.com.br/negocios-
novos-projetos_07.asp ("The construction of the Madeira power plants forms part of a large
project for regional sustainable development, national integration, and improving the lives of
the people of Rond6nia, Acre, Amazonas and Mato Grosso.") (author's translation).
6. See IIRSA, supra note 2 ("The provision of these infrastructure services aims to
promote the development of business and productive chains with big economies of scale
throughout these hubs, either for domestic consumption in the region or for export to global
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has tended to occur piecemeal, on a small-scale level. Thus, projects are
viewed regionally in some respects but individually in others.7 This dis-
continuity in perspective sets the stage for a politically, environmentally,
and socioeconomically disastrous outcome.8 Numerous other infrastruc-
ture projects in the region demonstrate the potential for human rights
abuses, including violations of the rights to life, health, adequate stan-
dard of living, and healthy environment, as well as the rights of
indigenous peoples.9
markets."); IIRSA, Which Integration and Development Hubs Have Been Identified?, http://
www.iirsa.org/BancoConocimiento/F/fmcuales son-los.ejes-de-integracion-y-desarrollos_
identificados/fmcuales son los ejes-de-integracion-y-desarrollos identificados ENG.asp?
Codldioma=ENG.
A Business Vision was prepared for each [Hub] to identify currently prevailing eco-
nomic activities by using territorial references, present a characterization of existing
basic infrastructure, and propose guidance for future developments based on their
productive possibilities and potential within the framework of the most relevant re-
gional and global trends. The Business Vision for each Hub was used to report on
the analysis of the identified infrastructure projects and set up the IIRSA Project
Portfolio.
Id. But see IIRSA, What are the Characteristics of the IIRSA Project Portfolio?, http://www.
iirsa.org/BancoConocimiento/F/fm-que-caracteristicas-tiene-Ia-cartera-de-proyectos-iirsa/
fm.quecaracteristicastiene la cartera-de-proyectosiirsaENG.asp?Codldioma=ENG
(classifying expected impacts from implementation into "two strategic dimensions of analysis:
contribution to sustainable development and feasibility").
7. Power plant builder FURNAS describes the projects individually when discussing
licensing but regionally when discussing the projects' scope; this position proves hard to rec-
oncile. "Mariangela [Damberg], of FURNAS, affirms that currently, only licensing of the
hydroelectric power stations is being discussed .... However, ... FURNAS' headquarters in
Rio de Janeiro ... stated exactly the opposite: 'FURNAS participates in the Rio Madeira hy-
droelectric power project, an undertaking that aside from generating energy will enable
navigation between Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru.'" Gustavo Faleiros, Furnas e Odebrecht ainda
tom muito o que explicar sobre hidrelictricas no Rio Madeira [Furnas and Odebrecht Still
Have a Lot to Explain About the Rio Madeira Projects], 0 Eco, July 20, 2006, http://
www.riosvivos.org.br/canal.php?canal=318&mat-id=9330 (author's translation).
8. See FURNAS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT [EIA]: HIERARCHY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (2005).
9. See, e.g., Letter from Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens [MAB], Nat'l
Secretariat, to Enrique V. Iglesias, President, Inter-Am. Dev. Bank (June 2, 2005) [hereinafter
Cana Brava Letter] (requesting relief for forced relocation without just compensation or mitiga-
tion in Cana Brava, which infringed the right to adequate standard of living and the right to
information), available at http://www.bicusa.org/Legacy/MAB-letterPortuguese.pdf; JUSTIgA
GLOBAL ET AL., ATINGIDOS E BARRADOS: As VIOLA 6ES DE DIREITOS HUMANOS NA
HIDRELtTRICA CANDONGA [AFFECTED AND OBSTRUCTED: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS FROM
THE CANDONGA DAM] 69-76 (2004) (noting violations in Candonga of the ability to support
an adequate standard of living in terms of housing location, habitability, accessibility, security of
tenure, provision of services, and cultural adequacy, as well as the rights to public health, human
dignity, subsistence work, and public participation); Ag~ncia de Informa 5o Frei Tito para a
America Latina, UHE Campos Novos-Impactos de vazamento sdo subestimados [Campos
Novos Dam-Impacts of Flooding are Underestimated], July 8, 2006, http://www.rbrasil.
org.br/content,0,0,1066,0,0.html [hereinafter Agdncia de Informagdo] (describing infringe-
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Environmental impact assessments provide a means to anticipate and
mitigate these harms, but current assessments are limited to sub-sectors
of the full project area, leading to an incomplete picture of the damage
that will result. ' The potential human rights violations and other harms
arising from these projects, in and beyond the officially recognized ar-
eas, are actionable under both national and international law. As a result,
ignoring the true scope of the project area in the planning phase will not
preclude state responsibility in the long run. 1
Consequently, regional projects require regional planning to avoid
potentially disastrous environmental and human rights abuses. Focusing
on the Rio Madeira project in Brazil as a case study in the impacts of
infrastructure projects, this Note identifies the harm anticipated from
these projects and highlights the need for verification of official predic-
tions of such harm. It then proceeds to a legal analysis, addressing the
applicable international law, Brazilian law, and regional legal frame-
works and outlining the negative legal consequences arising from
inadequate impact assessments. In light of these negative legal implica-
tions, the Note concludes by illustrating the need to proceed with
planning and implementation of these projects only under a comprehen-
sive, regional lens.
ments on the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to information, as well as
adverse impacts to the natural environment); Press Release, Movimento dos Atingidos por
Barragens [MAB], MAB Exige da FATMA revogagdo da Licenga de Operagdo da hidreldtrica
que vazou em Campos Novos, SC [MAB Demands the FATMA Revoke the Operating
License for the Dam that Flooded Campos Novos, SC] (July 6, 2006), http://
www.ecoagencia. com.br/index.phpoption=content&task=view&id=1703&Itemid=59; GRUPO
TRABALHO ENERGIA DO FORUM BRASILEIRO DE ONGs E MOVIMENTOS SOCIALS PARA O MEIO
AMBIENTE E DESENVOLVIMENTO [GTE-FBOMS] [WORK GROUP ON ENERGY OF THE BRAZIL-
IAN FORUM OF NGOs AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT]
& AMIGOS DA TERRA BRASIL [FRIENDS OF THE EARTH BRAZIL], HIDRELI2TRICAS NA BACIA DO
RIO URUGUAI: GUIA PARA ONGs E MOVIMENTOS SOCIAS [HYDROELECTRIC POWER STATIONS
ON THE RIO URUGUAI BASIN: A GUIDE FOR NGOs AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS] 32 (2006) (de-
tailing the abuses in Barra Grande).
10. See, e.g., Ag~ncia de Informaqdo, supra note 9.
11. See id. The IIRSA Secretariat takes a hands-off approach to specific planning ele-
ments, making each country's national IIRSA coordinator the only potentially accountable
actors in the planning realm of IIRSA. See Interview with Alejandra Radl, Secretariat staff,
IIRSA, in Buenos Aires, Arg. (June 21, 2006) (emphasizing that IRSA's role consists of coor-
dination, facilitation, and planning in the broadest sense).
[Vol. 28:175
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Initiative for the Integration of Regional
Infrastructure in South America
In August 2000, the presidents of South America's twelve countries
created an initiative consisting of plans for infrastructure projects
throughout South America. 2 To execute the initiative, labeled IIRSA,
those government heads placed the technical coordination and operation
in the hands of three multilateral development banks-the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the Andean Development Corpora-
tion (CAF),'3 and the Financial Fund for the Development of the Rio de
la Plata Basin-forming the IIRSA Secretariat. 4 National development
banks like the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), as well as the
private sector, emerged as sources of further financial support.
5
This endeavor conceived of a ten-year timeline (2000-2010) for out-
lining project plans. Presented with an opportunity for funding, the
twelve countries of South America each submitted a wish list of projects
for inclusion in the IRSA initiative. 6 Despite IIRSA's goal of regional
integration, the individual countries did not fully embrace the mindset of
regionalism in creating these lists. Rather, many of these projects were
"in fact old, unfinished national infrastructure projects ... being inte-
grated into the regional framework in the hopes of breathing new life
into them."'8
As expected from such a broad request for proposals, the development
banks lacked sufficient capacity to fund all of the proposed projects.' 9
Charged with the task of narrowing the undertaking, government officials
12. See IIRSA, supra note 4.
13. For more on the CAF and its relation to IIRSA, see Lyra Sprang, La Corporacidn
Andina de Fomnento: La Caja Negra de las Instituciones Financieras Internacionales,
BICECA MONTHLY BULL., Mar. 2006, at 5-7, available at http://biceca.org/proxy/Document.
62.aspx.
14. INTERACTION, INTERACTION IDB ANNUAL MEETING E-BULLETIN, Mar. 2004, at
53, available at http://www.interaction.org/files.cgi/2810_SpecialEbulletinforLima IDB
andRegional-Integration.pdf; IIRSA, Technical Coordination Committee, http://www.iirsa.
org/cctENG.asp? Codldioma=ENG.
15. INTERACTION, supra note 14, at 53.
16. Interview with Alejandra Radl, supra note 11.
17. BICECA, supra note I ("[E]ven the President of the IDB, Mr. Enrique Iglesias,
admits that 'excess liquidity' is the force driving these huge infrastructure projects, not, as
IIRSA coordinators would like one to believe, the ... dream of a unified South America ....
Therefore, while the IIRSA discourse is integrationist, its logic is mainly financial.").
18. Id.
19. For instance, Argentina alone submitted approximately one hundred projects.
Interview with Alejandra Radl, supra note 11.
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established a portfolio of 335 projects. In this way, the government of-
ficials comprising IIRSA, overseen by the IIRSA Secretariat, had a hand
in the process until the project selection stage. From the IIRSA Secre-
tariat's standpoint, responsibility for all subsequent aspects of the
process, including environmental assessments, fell to the national coor-
dinators individually, rather than to regional planners collectively.
21
22IIRSA thus plays no role in conducting environmental assessments .
B. The Peru-Brazil-Bolivia Hub
The Peru-Brazil-Bolivia hub exemplifies the scope of the transna-
tional issues involved in the IIRSA development project. Among the 335
infrastructure projects that fall under the IIRSA umbrella, eighteen are
classified as part of this hub.23 Estimated investment in these eighteen
projects is $11.6 billion.24 Official state estimates of projected impacts,
funded by the Brazilian state hydropower company FURNAS Centrais
E16tricais S.A (FURNAS), identified over seventy adverse impacts from
these eighteen projects: twenty-three were classified as "very high" ad-
verse impact and thirteen as "high" adverse impact.25 These estimates
classify only nine impacts as "beneficial," demonstrating that the nega-
tive environmental and human impacts will far outweigh improvements
such as increased jobs and economic prosperity.26 Illustrating the degree
of environmental alteration involved in the projects, one Brazilian news
bureau noted that at least fifteen "natural obstacles" would be removed
in order to build the hydroelectric complex.27
20. See IIRSA, PROJECT PORTFOLIO 2004 (2004). See also Ministry of Planning,
Futuro dos Paises estd na Integrardo da Regido [The Future of the Nations is in the
Integration of the Region], Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.planejamento.gov.br/planejamento-
investimento/conteudo/noticias/noticia2005/051207_futuropais.htm. Even this reduced list
presented an insurmountable challenge; thus, the governments unanimously agreed on thirty-
one projects for which the banks would prioritize implementation. Civil society took no part in
these decisions. Interview with Alejandra Radl, supra note 11.
21. Interview with Alejandra Radl, supra note 11.
22. Id.
23. See IIRSA, What are the Characteristics of the IIRSA Project Portfolio?, supra note
6.
24. Id.
25. FURNAS ET AL., supra note 8.
26. Id.
27. The Hydroelectric Model Moves Forward in Brazil, RADIO MUNDo REAL, Dec. 8,
2005, http://www.radiomundoreal.fmmodules.php?newlang=eng&op=modload&name=News&
file=article&sid=7893.
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The extent of the impact goes far beyond the natural environment
and in many cases will be irreversible.28 According to one civil society
group wary of the IIRSA projects,
[t]he combination of investment in highway construction, wide-
spread dredging, and dams proposed under IIRSA, with
significant private sector investments in resource extraction and
large-scale agricultural production ... will not only have direct
effects on biodiversity conservation, but also disruptive indirect
effects on the small farm and agricultural labor sectors. Histori-
cally, this has led to the displacement of rural and indigenous
peoples, massive migration, and deforestation. All of these de-
velopments potentially undermine the viability of the region's
small-farm sector, established parks, indigenous lands, and bio-
diversity reserves.29
Clearly presented in IRSA's project plans for the Peru-Brazil-
Bolivia Hub are the Rio Madeira Projects. 30 Less clear is the interrelat-
edness of those projects' components. IIRSA describes the Rio Madeira
Projects as three projects within the hub: the "Madeira River hydroelec-
tric complex, including floodgates for navigation"; the "Bolivia-Brazil
bi-national hydroelectric plant"; and the "[t]ransmission line between the
two hydroelectric power plants on the Madeira River and the central sys-
tem."
3
'
Breaking the complex down into smaller projects in this way has led
to some confusion as to whether each project individually forms part of
IIRSA.32 This classification will directly affect the scope of any envi-
ronmental impact assessments. For example, if the project as a whole is
classified as part of IIRSA, then the secretariat would presumably ensure
that an assessment covering the entire project was completed before con-
struction. However, if the projects are individually classified as part of
IIRSA, the assessments conducted by the various agencies will only take
account of the limited areas surrounding the individual projects. The
former president of BNDES revealed the interconnected nature of the
projects when he explained that
28. BICECA, supra note 1 ("The environmental, social, cultural, and economic impacts
of these projects on such areas as the Andes piedmont, the Amazon Basin, Brazil's Mato
Grosso and Pantanal, and the Paraguay and Parani rivers will be significant, and in many
cases, irreversible.").
29. Id.
30. See IIRSA, supra note 20; IIRSA, supra note 2.
31. IIRSA, G3 - Madeira-Madre de Dios-Beni River Corridor, Peru-Brazil-Bolivia
Hub, http://www.iirsa.org/BancoConocimiento/E/eje-peru-brasil-bolivia-grupo-3/eje-peru-
brasil-bolivia-grupo_3_ENG.asp?Codldioma=ENG.
32. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
Fall 20061
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[t]he Madeira River Complex project includes two hydroelectric
dams in Brazil; floodgates for making the river navigable, which
will require the elimination of a zone of waterfalls that "inter-
rupt" navigation; a hydroelectric dam on the Beni River in
Bolivia; and ports for the Madeira-Gupore-Beni-Madre de Dios
waterway in Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru.33
The two hydroelectric dams are the Santo Ant6nio and Jirau dams, cur-
rently the subject of planning by FURNAS.34 These dams' location in the
same complex as the two other dams, floodgates, and ports suggests a
need to evaluate impacts collectively in order to account for cumulative
impacts.
While FURNAS initially denied to the author that the Madeira pro-
jects have anything to do with IIRSA, thus allowing FURNAS to plan
each project individually, it later admitted more than just a coincidence
in project plans.35 Indeed, FURNAS provided an article it had published
describing the Madeira project as "part of a broad regional development
plan, known as [IIRSA], which combines the efforts of several South
American governments. 36 Thus, it is clear that the Madeira projects form
part of IIRSA.
III. APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
A. International Law
International human rights law establishes numerous obligations that
arise in the context of infrastructure projects like the Rio Madeira com-
plex. Specifically, the Rio Madeira project may result in violations of the
rights to life, health, adequate standard of living, and healthy environ-
ment, as well as the rights of indigenous peoples. Though not binding,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) uses compelling
language to denounce basic human rights violations.37 More importantly,
most of the guarantees in the UDHR also appear in either the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
33. ZIBECHI, supra note 3 (quoting Carlos Lessa, ex-president of the BNDES).
34. FURNAS, supra note 3, at 1.
35. Interview with Acyr Jorge Teixeira Gonqalves, Envtl. Advisor, and Maria do Carmo
Reis Cavalcanti, Technical Advisor for Hydraulic Energy Generation, FURNAS, in Rio de
Janeiro, Braz. (July 4, 2006).
36. FURNAS, supra note 3.
37. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 3, 25, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
[Vol. 28:175
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(ICESCR), which are binding on state parties that have ratified them."
All twelve South American countries have ratified the ICCPR and the
ICESCR.3 9
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights have broadly interpreted the rights en-
shrined in these human rights covenants.40 Additionally, the Inter-
American Court has made clear that state parties to the American Con-
vention on Human Rights must uphold the Article 1(1) duty to respect
and guarantee human rights contained in the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man. In the past, this approach has led the In-
ter-American Court to recognize potential violations of rights to life,
privacy, family, participation in government, and movement and resi-
dence, as well as freedoms of association, conscience, and religion. 2 In
addition, the Inter-American Court has recognized the possible intersec-
tion of these rights with those of indigenous peoples, despite the lack of
• 43
explicit protection for indigenous peoples' rights in its covenants.
In Brazil specifically, the Inter-American Court held the state ac-
countable for complicity in murder in several cases under right-to-life
38. Only in instances of violations of jus cogens norms-genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity-are states bound regardless of status as a party. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 12-24 (2001).
39. U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal Hu-
man Rights Treaties, June 9, 2004, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Newton Coutinho Mendes v. Brazil, Case 11.405, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 59/99, OEA/Ser.LIV/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 101 (1999), available at http://www.
cidh.org/annualrep/98eng/Merits/Brasil%2011405.htm (evaluating the right to life claim "in
its relationship to the commitment of the State, established in Article 1(1), to respect and
guarantee the full exercise of every right recognized in the Convention"); Mayagna (Sumo)
Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 148 (Aug. 31,
2001), available at http:llwww.corteidh.or.cr/docslcasoslarticuloslseriec-79-ing.pdf (inter-
preting Article 21 of the American Convention of the Rights and Duties of Man to protect "the
right to property in a sense which includes, among others, the rights of members of the in-
digenous communities within the framework of communal property").
41. See, e.g., Corumbiard v. Brazil, Case 11.556, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 32/04,
OEA/Ser.L.V/II. 122, doc. 5 rev. 3 (2004), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
2004eng/Brazil. I 1556eng.htm#_ftnref 1; Joao Canuto de Oliveira v. Brazil, Case 11.287, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Report No. 24/98, OEA/Ser.L[V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/brazill 1287.htm (declaring that the Brazilian state "must
answer internationally for the violation of the right to life" for acts and omissions of its public
officials, agents, and institutions related to the commission, investigation, and prosecution of
murder); Diniz Bento da Silva v. Brazil (the Teixeirihna Case), Case 11.517, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 23/02, doc. 5 rev. 34 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
2002eng/Brazil. 1 1.517.htm (finding that it was not necessary to identify the perpetrators of the
crimes).
42. See Mayagna, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 156 ("[Nicaragua
breached a combination of these rights] by ignoring and rejecting the territorial claim of the
Community and granting a logging concession within the traditional land of the Community
without consulting the opinion of the Community.").
43. Id.
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claims." In these cases the Court established that the state breached
its duty under the Convention's right-to-life provisions by neglecting
to prevent the murders, pass legislation, and prosecute the perpetra-
tors of the crime to obtain compensation for the victims. 5 Trying
claims arising from forced relocation that led to a massacre in
Rond6nia, the Inter-American Court found that Brazil violated rights
to life, humane treatment, and fair trial in connection with its duty to
guarantee fundamental human rights.46 The Court additionally recog-
nized forced relocation as the cause of a right-to-life violation.4 7
While violations of rights to health, adequate standard of living,
healthy environment, and the rights of indigenous peoples have not
been litigated in Brazil, other cases demonstrate that the state may
face liability for such abuses. The right to health shows potential as a
means of recovery, as it exists in strict, definite terms. 48 Article 12 of
the ICESCR creates specific obligations on states with respect to in-
fant mortality, environmental and industrial hygiene, diseases, and
medical treatment. 49 Thus, the ICESCR defines the content of the
right to health in a way that encompasses specific elements of the
right, enabling victims to prevail more easily under the right to health
than under a more general right such as the right to life. 0
Although less circumscribed than the right to health, the right to
an adequate standard of living provides a means for bringing claims
when its deprivation is sufficiently severe. While Article 11 of the
ICESCR does not explicitly define "adequate," it does establish a
minimum core obligation of "basic needs" that requires all states to
recognize the right to adequate food, clothing, and housing.5 ' There-
fore, when a state fails to provide these basic needs, those who are
deprived have a valid fundamental human rights claim, essentially
44. See, e.g., Jodo Canuto, Case 11.287, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 24/98;
Teixeirihna, Case 11.517, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/02.
45. Jodo Canuto, Case 11.287, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 24/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.98, doc. 6 rev. 43.
46. See Corumbiard, Case 11.556, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 32/04, OEA/Ser.L./
V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. (finding violations of Articles 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 25 of the American Con-
vention).
47. Id. IT 150, 170, 196, 198.
48. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR],
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
49. Id. art. 12(2).
50. See, e.g., Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria,
Case No. ACHPR/COMMIA044/1, Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights, Commc'n
No. 155/96 (2001) [hereinafter Nigeria Case]; Yanomami v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 12/85, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985).
51. Asbjom Eide, Article 25, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY 385, 394 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1992).
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employing the right to life to elevate the adequate-standard-of-living
claim.
The right to water has been inferred from the language of both
Article 25 of the UDHR and Article 11 of the ICESCR. While no spe-
cific "right to water" exists, it is "understood as part of the right to
life, as a component of the right to health, and as part of the right to
food. 52 To date, plaintiffs have incorporated the right to water in the
broader context of water contamination and pollution rather than
claiming it as a distinct right.53 The Inter-American Court has demon-
strated its willingness to recognize these violations as violations of
the right to an adequate standard of living.54 The African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights has displayed a similar propensity to
recognize these violations, as has the European Court of Human
Rights.55
The right to a healthy environment, related to the adequate stan-
dard of living but conceived of as a separate right, has yet not
achieved binding status in international law. Notably, in the Americas,
[s]ince the end of 1999, several precedent-setting, nonpartisan
case briefs (amicus curiae) presented before the Inter-
American Court on [sic] Human Rights in Costa Rica and at
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Wash-
ington, D.C., have successfully influenced the Court and
Commission to consider environmental degradation as a vio-
lation of human rights.56
Numerous cases brought before international human rights tribu-
nals illustrate the multiplicity of rights in indigenous peoples' claims,
including rights to life, health, and property.57 Cases supporting in-
digenous peoples' rights in the Inter-American system include
52. Ignacio J. Alvarez, The Right to Water as a Human Right, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 71, 72 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003).
53. See, e.g., Nigeria Case, Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/l, Commc'n No. 155/96;
Zander v. Sweden, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (1995).
54. See Yanomami, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/85; Mayagna (Sumo)
Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
55. See Nigeria Case, Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, Commc'n No. 155/96;
Zander, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175.
56. Jorge Daniel Taillant, Environmental Advocacy and the Inter-American Human Rights
System, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 52, at 118, 119 (noting
that these claims did not rely on the San Salvador Protocol's right to a healthy environment).
57. See, e.g., Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Commc'n No. 167/1984 (26 March 1990),
U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) (1990); Nigeria Case, Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/I,
Commc'n No. 155/96; Mayagna, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 79; Dann v. United
States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.LJV/I. 117, doc. I rev. 1
(2002); Yanomami v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/85, OAS/Ser.L/
V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. (1985).
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Mayagna8 in Nicaragua, Enxet-Lamenxay59 in Paraguay, and Lhaka
Honhat in Argentina. In Mayagna, the Court recognized violations of
property rights by upholding claims based on freedom of movement
and residence. 60 Enxet-Lamenxay and Lhaka Honat were resolved
through friendly settlements recognizing rights to land.6'
B. National Laws of Brazil
International law is generally unavailable prior to the exhaustion
of national legal remedies. While Brazil's legal system is well devel-
oped, it has not proven effective in averting human rights disasters62
and has fallen short of delivering human rights protection mandated
by international and national law. As a result, most individuals suffer-
ing human rights abuses must resort to the international legal system
for relief.
Brazil's federal legislation protects human rights implicated by
IIRSA projects. Both the Constitui(Oo Federal (Federal Constitution),
and licensing statutes emanating mainly from Brazil's Ministry of the
Environment (MMA) and two of the ministry's organs, the National
Environmental Council (CONAMA) and the National Environmental
Agency (IBAMA), set forth provisions on human rights and environ-
mental impact assessments.63 The Federal Constitution guarantees
socioeconomic rights, including rights to health, work, and an ade-
quate standard of living. 4 The Constitution also sets forth law
specifically related to environmental impact assessments (EIAs),
65
requiring an environmental impact study prior to any activity that
66
may potentially cause significant harm to the environment.
58. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, I 139, 155, 169 (Aug. 31, 2001).
59. Enxet-Lamenxay & Kayleyphapopyet (Riachito) Indigenous Communities v. Para-
guay, Case 11.713, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 90/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev.
(1999), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Friendly/Paraguay 11.713.htm.
60. See Corumbiard v. Brazil, Case 11.556, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 32/04,
OEA/Ser.L.IV/II.122, doc. 5 rev. (2004); Dann, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
75/02; Mayagna, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79.
61. See Enxet-Lamenxay, Case 11.713, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 90/99. The terms
of the friendly settlement under negotiation in Lhaka Honhat also acknowledges infringement
of rights to life and health. See Aboriginal Cmty. of Lhaka Honhat ("Our Land") v. Argentina,
Petition 12.094, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 78/06 (Oct. 21, 2006), available at http://
www.cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/ARGENTINA. 12094eng.htm.
62. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
63. Brazilian Ministry of the Environment [MMA], 0 que 6 CONAMA? [What is
CONAMA?], http://www.mma.gov.br/port/conama/estr.cfm.
64. Constituiqdo Federal [C.E] [Federal Constitution] art. 6 (Braz.).
65. C.F. art. 225. See also JUSTI A GLOBAL ET. AL., supra note 9, at 72.
66. See C.F. art. 225, § I (IV), translated in John C. Tucker, Constitutional Codification
of an Environmental Ethic, 52 FLA. L. REV. 299, 313 (2000).
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National legislation further guarantees rights to health,67
water,68 a healthy environment (through the right to life),69 and par-
ticipation in public life.
70
CONAMA has also passed resolutions defining obligations under
the EIAs for large public works projects, particularly those involving
electricity generation.7 1 These regulations outline three steps of the li-
censing process: 1) Licenza Prgvia, which requires a showing of
viability from economic and engineering standpoints, completion of the
EIA and a Report of Environmental Impacts,72 and public hearings;
2) Licenga de Instala9do, which authorizes project implementation; and
3) Licenga de Operagdo, which authorizes operation of the project after
verification that the required studies provide the requested data.73 The
regulations also provide for suspension or cancellation of environmental
licensing in the event of violation of legal norms or conditions, omission
or falsification of data relevant to obtaining a license, or serious risks to
health or the environment.74
IBAMA also has developed Instru9do Normativa N' 0 65,"5 which
consists of regulations specific to licensing large infrastructure projects
with multistate impacts, as well as gas and petroleum-related activities
67. C.F arts. 196-200.
68. Lei No. 9.433, de 8 de janeiro de 1997, D.O.U. de 09.01.1997 (Brazil). See also
Roberto Malvezzi, Transposi9do x Direito Humano a Agua, in REDE SOCIAL DE JUSTI.A E
DIREITOS HUMANOS, DIREITos HUMANOS NO BRASIL 2005 63, 65 (2005) [hereinafter REDE
SOCIAL].
69. See JUSTI A GLOBAL ET AL., supra note 9, at 72.
70. CF. art. 225; Resoluqo No. 237/97, art. 3, de 19 de dezembro de 1997, D.O.U. de
22.12.1997 (Brazil); Resolug~o No. 009/87, art. 1, de 3 de dezembro de 1987, D.O.U. de
05.07.1990 (Brazil); Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de julho de 2001, D.O.U. de 11.07.2001 (Brazil),
available at http://www.ibamapr.hpg.ig.com.br/102571eiEhtm. See also JUSTI A GLOBAL ET
AL., supra note 9, at 75.
71. Resolugo No. 006/87, de 16 de setembro de 1987, D.O.U. de 22.10.1987 (Brazil).
72. The Relat6rio de Impacto [Meio] Ambiental (RIMA) is developed from the Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment. Resoluqdo No. 001/86, de 23 de janeiro de 1986, D.O.U. de
17.02.1986 (Brazil).
73. Resoluq.o No. 237/97, arts. 3, 18, de 19 de dezembro de 1997, D.O.U. de
22.12.1997 (Brazil). See also IBAMA, Termo de Refer~ncia para Elaboraqbo do Estudo de
Impacto Ambiental e o Respectivo Relat6rio de Impacto Ambiental [Terms of Reference for
Elaboration of EIA and Respective RIMA], 3 (2005), available at http://www.ibama.gov.br/
licenciamento/modulos/arquivo.php?codarqweb=truhe (citing CF. art. 225).
74. Resoluqdo No. 237/97, supra note 73, art. 19.
75. Instmgo Normativa No. 065, de 13 de abril de 2005, D.O.U. de 27.04.2005
(Brazil), available at http://www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/modulos/arquivo.php?cod-
arqweb=IN065. This legislation encompasses Usinas Hidrelitricas [UHEs] [hydroelectric
power plants] and Pequenas Centrais Hidrelitricas [PCHs] [micro hydroelectric power sta-
tions]-projects with the "potential to cause significant environmental degradation." IBAMA,
Licenciamento Ambiental Federal, http://www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/index.php (follow
"Legislaqiio," then "Instrug6es Normativas") (author's translation).
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on a continental scale.76 This legislation outlines four primary
requirements: 1) Instaura9do do Processo, which requires an inventory
to determine general project feasibility; 2) Licenciamento Prgvia;7 7 (3)
Licenciamento de InstalaVao;78 and 4) Licenciamento de Opera0do.9
Thus, projects like the Rio Madeira dams are subject to CONAMA's
regulations governing large public works, as well as IBAMA's licensing
scheme for both large projects generally and power plants in particular.
Obtaining the Licenga Prvia is arguably the most crucial step under
both schemes. In this stage the determination of viability takes into ac-
count initial, general feasibility studies, as well as detailed projections of
impacts as indicated by the EIA, among other assessment tools.
Part of this phase entails presenting the impacts to the public at
audiencias ptiblicas.° At these public forums, legislators and govern-
ment officials listen to comments from members of the public and decide
whether and how to accommodate those concerns. Along with the EIAs,
audiencias ptiblicas aim to resolve problems and minimize impacts prior
to granting the Licenga Privia.8"
Although Brazil's detailed national process aims to protect human
rights by requiring extensive planning, EIAs, and public hearings, this
system has not succeeded in avoiding failures, as evidenced by a signifi-
cant human rights investigation conducted by the United Nations at a
dam site in southern Brazil.82 As the following discussion indicates, by
focusing only on local planning, Brazil's national regulatory and plan-
ning scheme does not adequately protect human rights. A regional
approach to planning would more effectively protect the human rights of
the region's inhabitants by enabling consideration of cumulative impacts
that would otherwise remain undetected prior to construction.
76. IBAMA, Licenciamento Ambiental Federal [Federal Environmental Licensing],
http://www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/.
77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. See also Resolu(5o No. 237/97, arts. 1,
8, de 19 de dezembro de 1997, D.O.U. de 22.12.1997, (Brazil); C.E art. 225.
78. See the legislation cited in note 77, supra.
79. Id.
80. For more on audigncias pablicas, see IBAMA, Licenciamento Ambiental Federal,
http://www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/index.php.
81. See Instruqo Normativa No. 065, art. 6, de 13 de abril de 2005, D.O.U. 27.04.2005
(Brazil).
82. See GTE-FBOMS, supra note 9, at 27.
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IV. DOMESTIC DEFICIENCY AND A COUNTERVAILING TOOL
A. Domestic Deficiency: Failures of Brazil's National System
State responsibility for legal violations arises from the actions of the
state's public officials, agents, and institutions." Notably, many energy
companies like FURNAS are state-run, and in major projects "the Bra-
zilian authorities appear to be on the side of the Consortium, as well as
[that of] agents violating fundamental rights of citizens, ruining, instead
of promoting, their prospects for a quality of life with dignity.' 84 These
infrastructure projects therefore involve state action, both through af-
firmative acts and the failure to protect fundamental rights.
Past dam projects, such as those in Barra Grande and Campos No-
vos, have demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Brazil's regulatory and
licensing process and the overall failure of the Brazilian government to
protect its citizens' rights.85 In Barra Grande in 2004, a network of NGOs
in the Mata Atldntica region and the Federation of Ecologists of Santa
Catarina prevailed in a civil action against IBAMA and the energy com-
pany Barra Grande Energy.86 The defendants were held liable for
falsifying the EIA by neglecting to address four million hectares of the
Mata AtlIntica rainforest," including threatened ecosystems.8 The fed-
eral judge explained that the creation of a fraudulent EIA threatened the
integrity of the licensing process:
Now, if the environmental licensing which resulted in the grant-
ing of the licenga privia and licenga da instala9do was premised
on an environmental study that was not in compliance or was
only formally compliant, the ENTIRE licensing process is com-
pletely vitiated, . . . because the actual situation, which is
83. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
84. JUSTI A GLOBAL ET AL., supra note 9, at 74 (author's translation).
85. See sources cited supra note 9.
86. Rede de ONGs da Mata Atldntica (RMA) & Federaco de Entidades Ecologistas
Catarinenses (FEEC) v. IBAMA & Energ6tica Barra Grande S.A.-BAESA, Acdo Civil Ptiblica
2000.72.00.009825-0, as cited in Apremavi, Ago Civil Ptiblica Barra Grande deferida por
justiqa federal [Barra Grande Public Civil Action Approved by Federal Justice], Oct. 27, 2004,
available at http://www.apremavi.com.br/news/pnews047.htm [hereinafter Aqdo Civil Ptiblica].
87. Eduardo Luiz Zen, Fraude em Estudo Garantiu Licenva para Constru(Oo de
Hidrelitrica [Fraud in the Study Guaranteed [Approval for] Hydroelectric Construction Li-
cense], Oct. 21, 2004, available at http://www.consciencia.net/2004/mes/10/barragrande-
crime.html#acompanhe (quoting Barra Grande Energy's EIA/RIMA, which described the
affected areas merely as "minor cultural sites, low waterfalls, and sparsely wooded fields")
(author's translation).
88. Press Release, Instituto Socioambiental [ISA], Barra Grande: nova deciso judicial
proibe desmatamento retomado ap6s acordo [Barra Grande: New Judicial Decision Prohibits
Deforestation that Resumed after Settlement Agreement] (May 1, 2005), http://www.
socioambiental.org/nsa/detalhe?id=1 892.
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contrary [to the one portrayed in the EIA], was not held to strict
compliance with the legal requirements and regulations. 9
As a result of the Barra Grande case, the licensing process now re-
quires government agencies and NGOs, as representatives of the affected
population, to develop Terms of Agreement, which set forth detailed
measures with which regulated entities and the government must comply
to protect the public interest, human health, and the environment.' De-
spite this step, police brutality against eight people in Barra Grande
followed the decision in January 2005, 9' and IBAMA still granted the
Ligenca da Opera9do for Barra Grande in July 2005 without resolving
conflicts between the government and the affected population.92
As political science professor Sergio Abranches noted, "[i]t is
enough to take a superficial look at the legislation regulating environ-
mental licensing and CONAMA rules to see that the majority of the
procedures are not being complied with."93 One reason for these viola-
tions is that the potential gain from investment outweighs the potential
risk of punishment, leading developers and institutions to disregard ex-
isting regulations. "Investors can use inaccurate or distorted information
because the penalty for doing so is minimal compared to the profits driv-
ing these projects."
Unfortunately, Barra Grande is not an isolated example.95 In Campos
Novos, construction of the dam began before licensing approval.96 A De-
cember 2005 UN human rights investigation in the Rio Uruguai basin,
89. Aqdo Civil PNiblica, supra note 86 (emphasis in original) (author's translation).
90. See, e.g., GTE-FBOMS, supra note 9, at 54.
91. Id. at 30.
92. Id. at 29.
93. Sergio Abranches, Licenciamento ou licenciosidade ambiental? [Licensing or
environmental license?], in BARRA GRANDE: A HIDRELtTRICA QUE NAO VIU A FLORESTA
[BARRA GRANDE: THE DAM THAT DIDN'T SEE THE RAINFOREST] 28, 28 (Miriam Prochnow
ed., 2005) (author's translation).
94. Id. at 29. See also infra note 147 and accompanying text (noting IBAMA's ac-
knowledgment of the lack of effective deterrence).
95. In the case of the Belo Monte dam, even though IBAMA halted licensing upon
learning that the indigenous Xingd had not been consulted, indigenous people ultimately suf-
fered adverse impacts resulting from the dam. Interview with Moara Giasson, Licensing
Coordinator for Hydroelectric Power Stations, IBAMA, in Brasflia, Braz. (Aug. 3, 2006). See
also Greenpeace Brasil, Congresso Desrespeita a Constitui9do Federal e autoriza construcdo
da hidrelitrica de Belo Monte [Congress Disrespects the Federal Constitution and Authorizes
Construction of the Belo Monte Dam] (July 13, 2005), http://www.amazonia.org.br/
noticias/noticia.cfmid=170023; Liderangas indigenas querem denunciar governo brasileiro
em semindrio internacional [Indigenous Leaders Want to Denounce the Brazilian Government
in an International Conference], AMBIENTE BRASIL, Dec. 5, 2005 (quoting Instituto
Socioambiental lawyer Raul Silva Telles do Valle), available at http://www.abdl.org.br/
article/view/2614/1/179.
96. GTE-FBOMS, supra note 9, at 26, 28.
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where the Campos Novos project was built, revealed human rights viola-
tions as a result of arbitrary detention, political violence, defamation,
and political persecution 97
In the wake of devastation from past dam projects, in 1993 environ-
mental law scholar John C. Tucker observed that "Brazil has recently
made substantial efforts to strengthen its environmental protection, in-
cluding the environmental provisions in the 1988 constitution, special
constitutional and statutory protection for specific geographic areas in
Brazil, and programs to strengthen environmental institutions and regu-
latory programs. '98 Yet in the face of repeated violations arising from
inadequately planned infrastructure projects like Barra Grande and
Campos Novos, the government's efforts and commitment have proven
insufficient. If history provides any indication of future government ef-
forts, relying on the environmental evaluation process as it now stands
will not protect human rights and the environment at the level required
by national law.
B. A Countervailing Tool: The Environmental
Impact Assessment
Although the outcome of past infrastructure projects suggests a need
for a more robust environmental planning process, the environmental
impact assessment is an existing tool that can prevent some of the nega-
tive impacts. The central objective of the EIA is to avoid detrimental or
catastrophic effects of projects that might appear justifiable through an
economic lens. The EIA holds a vital place in the legal and regulatory
sphere because enforcement mechanisms for much of environmental law
are weak. Unlike many other environmental regulatory tools, which ei-
ther are too broad, theoretical, ambiguous, or in practice are disregarded,
EIAs have come to be recognized as a prerequisite for project planning
and implementation.99
Structurally, the EIA is a hybrid of national, international, and pro-
ject-specific legislation. While EIAs are not currently required under
international law or custom, most states have domestic laws requiring
them for major infrastructure projects.'m Moreover, the existence of a
97. UN Recebe Demncia, ADITAL [LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN NEWS], Dec.
16, 2005, http://www.adital.com.br/site/noticia.asp?lang=PT&cod=20473.
98. Tucker, supra note 66, at 314 (citing C.F. art. 225).
99. See, e.g., supra note 88 and accompanying text.
100. The enormous popularity of the domestic EIA provides a possible foundation for a
global treaty on a transboundary EIA. John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary
Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 297-98 (2002). See BARRY
SADLER, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD: EVALUATING PRACTICE TO
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE 25 (1996).
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global movement toward developing international standards for envi-
ronmental impact assessments affirms the emerging importance of this
subject in the international arena.' °' Project-specific regulations pertain-
ing to EIAs also establish the importance of EIAs on a local level.
Efforts to create regional EIAs have emerged in Europe and North
America. In 1991, European countries drafted a regional EIA at the
Espoo Convention, which entered into force in 1997. '02 This agreement
includes an obligation for each state party to perform EIAs at an early
stage in the planning process and to notify and consult with other coun-
tries on all likely projects with potentially significant adverse impacts.' 3
Mexico, Canada, and the United States have initiated the Draft North
American Agreement on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assess-
ment, which establishes transboundary EIAs for projects throughout the
continent. '° The objectives of the draft agreement are to "provide deci-
sionmakers with information on transboundary environmental impacts so
that they can be taken into account, and 'to provide a mechanism for po-
tentially affected people and governments to participate in the process
leading to a decision on the project.'
Regardless of the source of the mandate for the EIA, the importance
of conducting comprehensive impact assessments cannot be overstated.
The purpose of an EIA compels its implementation in a way that accu-
rately gauges impacts by identifying, predicting, evaluating, and
mitigating physical, social, and other effects relevant to development
proposals before principal decisions and commitments are made.'06 Thus,
to be effective, an EIA must include the entire impact-bearing area.
The EIA's diagnostic function is particularly important for effective
protection against claims of injustice made prior to environmental dam-
age or during the construction and operation phases.'07 The EIA operates
101. See Tucker, supra note 66, at 314 ("The EIS requirement also coincides with inter-
national consensus that the EIS is an essential tool for environmental protection.").
102. Convention on Environmental Impact in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter Espoo Convention], available at http://www.unece.org/env/eial
eiatext.htm.
103. See id. arts. 3-5. See generally EUROPEAN COMM'N, GUIDANCE ON EIA: EIS RE-
VIEW (2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-guidelines/g-review-full-
text.pdf (presenting a European Union best practices guide).
104. See Knox, supra note 100, at 291 (citing N. Am. Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation
(NACEC), Draft North American Agreement on Transboundary Environmental Impact As-
sessment (derestricted Oct. 21, 1997), available at http://www.cec.org/pubs info_ resources/
law.treat-agree/pbl.cfm?varlan=english [hereinafter Draft EIA Agreement].
105. Id. at 308 (citing Draft EIA Agreement).
106. Denise Christina de Rezende Nicolaidis, A Avaliaqdo de Impacto Ambiental: uma
Anblise de Eficdcia [The Environmental Impact Assessment: an Analysis of Efficacy] at 28
(Dec. 2005) (unpublished dissertation, Universidade de Brasilia) (on file with author).
107. Id. at 32 n.17.
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as a preventive instrument by mandating disclosure of impacts before
licensing. ' 8 If the EIA is carried out in accordance with its purpose, "it
would not be possible to license projects expected to cause environ-
mental degradation in conflict with legal standards, unless suitable and
effective means of mitigation could be identified and a compliance
monitoring system instituted."' ' 9 If the anticipated environmental impact
were to exceed legal limits, the project would have to be rejected and the
license withheld by the public agency."0 Whether Brazil will strictly en-
force these standards for EIAs, however, is a separate inquiry.
For hydroelectric projects, the Brazilian government recognized the
importance of an integrated approach to impact assessment in develop-
ing the Integrated Environmental Assessment (AAI) after the Barra
Grande debacle."' The Ministry of Mines and Energy explains that the
objective of the AAI is to evaluate a river basin's environmental condi-
tion as it would exist with the proposed developments, considering both
cumulative and synergistic effects on natural resources and human popu-
lations, as well as actual and potential use of water resources in the
present and future. In addition, the AAI takes into account biodiversity
conservation, socioeconomic development, and the state's national and
international legal obligations in developing its energy production
plans.'
V. THE Rio MADEIRA CASE
Environmental regulation of infrastructure projects presents Brazil
with a prime opportunity to uphold the provisions of its laws. As John C.
Tucker notes:
A proposed waterway "improvement" project (the [Paraguay-
Parand] Hidrovia [transit-waterway]) could serve as a true test of
108. Id. at 45. In general, the objectives of EJAs are to assure explicit consideration of
environmental concerns along with their incorporation into the decision-making process; to
anticipate, avoid, minimize, or compensate for significant adverse physical, social, and other
effects relevant to the development proposals; to protect the productivity and capacity of natu-
ral systems and of ecological processes in order to maintain their environmental function; to
promote sustainable development; and to optimize use and management of resources. Id. at
28.
109. Id. at 45 (author's translation).
110. Id. at 45-46.
111. Resoluqdo No. 001/86, de 23 de janeiro de 1986, D.O.U. de 17.02.1986 (Brazil).
112. Ministdrio de Minas e Energia, Empresa de Pesquisa Energdtica, Meio Ambiente,
http://www.epe.gov.br/Lists/MeioAmbiente/DispForm.aspx?ID= 1 &Source=http%3A%2F%2
Fwww%2Eepe%2Egov%2Ebr%2FLists%2FMeioAmbiente%2FMeioAmbiente%2Easpx. The
Ministry's website also provides links to basin-wide negotiations, work plans, and other
related documents for several rivers.
Fall 20061
Michigan Journal of International Law
Brazil's resolve to enforce its constitutional environmental pro-
visions. The Brazilian Pantanal, one of the world's largest
wetlands, currently faces potential ecological disaster from this
internationally sanctioned economic development project. The
project is endorsed by several multilateral development banks,
several foreign governments, a multilateral trade organization,
and countries in the region."3
The similarities between the Paraguay-Parand hidrovia and the Rio
Madeira hidrovia show that the Rio Madeira projects, if implemented irre-
sponsibly, could test Brazil's commitment to its constitution. If Brazil truly
seeks to uphold its constitution, it could use these projects as an opportu-
nity to establish a more responsible approach to sustainable development.
To realize this objective, Brazil would need to break from its existing
record of "openly promot[ing] environmentally harmful projects on the
basis that abject economic and social conditions justify allocation of
scarce public resources to productive development activities, rather than
to environmental protection."'' 4 Brazil could accomplish this break by
demanding strict compliance with its licensing process, chiefly through
rigorous enforcement of EIA regulations. Also vital to the success of the
EIA is the degree to which it accurately reflects and effectively evaluates
the entire impact-generating project area. Reviewing the Rio Madeira
projects' progression through the licensing and EIA process reveals the
shortcomings in the scope of the EIAs and indicates the need for a
broader evaluation.
As noted above, the licensing process sets forth requirements that di-
rectly address potentially problematic aspects of development projects.' 5
Because these requirements are specific, compliance is easier to discern,
and holding parties accountable and ensuring delivery of results is feasi-
ble. However, such results depend on the regulated entities' cooperation
in compliance and the existence of able and willing enforcers.
In the case of the Rio Madeira projects, the licensing regulations re-
quire that the projects be completed in a socio-environmentally sound
manner. Up through the Ligenca Privia stage, the Brazilian government
113. Tucker, supra note 66, at 314 n.84 (internal citations omitted).
114. Tucker, supra note 66, at 314 (citing Roger W. Findley, Pollution Control in Brazil,
15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 30 (1988)). Compare id. with Cana Brava Letter, supra note 9; Ag6ncia
de Informaqdo, supra note 9; GTE-FBOMS, supra note 9. One case exemplifying such a posi-
tive progression is the Sdo Francisco dam project, for which IBAMA halted the licensing
process due to lack of adequate consultation with the public. Interview with Fabrina Furtado,
Executive Sec'y on Multifinancial Inst., Rede Brasil, in Brasflia, Braz. (Aug. 4, 2006).
115. See Resolugao No. 006/87, art. 1, de 16 de setembro de 1987, D.O.U. de
22.10.1987 (Brazil); Resolugio No. 237/97, art. 3, de 19 de dezembro de 1997, D.O.U. de
22.12.1997 (Brazil); Instruqdo Normativa No. 065, de 13 de abril de 2005, D.O.U. de
27.04.2005 (Brazil).
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has made efforts to oversee some semblance of an environmental as-
sessment process by adhering to the basic mandate of federal laws and
regulations related to EIAs. Given the influence of FURNAS and its
status as a state-run entity, however, strong pressure to push approvals
through the necessary channels casts serious doubt on the integrity of the
current assessments.' 16
IBAMA has upheld its EIA-related obligations and formally requested
complementary studies to the EIA and the Report of Environmental Im-
pacts (RIMA) conducted for the proposed Santo Ant6nio and Jirau
hydroelectric complexes.' 7 However, those studies only encompassed a
small area immediately surrounding the dam construction sites."8 IBAMA
is legally authorized to verify the complementary studies by contracting
with experts it regards as competent." 9 IBAMA indicated that based on the
studies it received, further details would be necessary before it would
grant the Licenga Prvia. 2"0 In general, IBAMA did not find the quality of
the studies to be poor, but rather sought a more integrated analysis of the
potential environmental impacts, including water quality analysis and im-
pacts on aquatic communities. 2 '
IBAMA acknowledged the presence of mercury in the Madeira
River and recognized the need to expand the analysis to include the riv-
erbed, as mercury contamination there would adversely affect, and in
many cases kill, fish and other species, including the local population
that relies on these species for food.'22 Likewise, IBAMA remains con-
cerned about the livelihood of gold miners and fishermen due to the
impact of mercury contamination.12 In addition, IBAMA noted that cur-
rent studies predict potential flooding in Bolivia if the complex is
completed.' 24 Until the studies disprove this possibility, IBAMA asserted
that it would not grant the license for the project.' 25
Still, despite these unresolved issues, IBAMA approved the
EIA/RIMA and the complementary studies as sufficient in September
116. See Glenn Switkes, Int'l Rivers Network, Madeira River Complex: Opportunism in
the Name of Integration, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.biceca.org/en/Article.25.aspx.
117. See Informaqdo T6cnica No. 12/2006, COLIC-HID/CGLIC/DILIQ/IBAMA, Brasilia,
Feb. 24, 2006 (on file with author); Sandra Tavares, Complexo Requer Critirio no
Licenciamento, diz lbama [Complex Requires Criteria for Licensing, says IBAMA], July 24,
2006, http://www.riosvivos.org.br/canal.php?canal=318&matid=9333.
118. Interview with Moara Giasson, supra note 95.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Tavares, supra note 117.
123. Id.; Informagho Tdcnica No. 12/2006, COLIC-HID/CGLIC/DILIQ/IBAMA,
Brasilia, Feb. 24, 2006, at 4 (on file with author).
124. Interview with Moara Giasson, supra note 95.
125. Id.
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2006,126 and audiencias pliblicas were held after the EIA's approval.' 7
According to IBAMA's Director of Environmental Licensing, Luiz
Felippe Kunz Jtnior, "if all goes according to plan and the projects are
deemed environmentally viable, IBAMA will grant the Licenga Prvia,
followed by the Licenga de Instala9do, which allows construction to be-
gin in August 2007. "'28 Thus, despite the significant potential of the
licensing process as a regulatory system, its role in the Madeira projects
demonstrates its inability to effectively influence the outcomes of the
projects so as to avoid the kinds of human rights violations that have
arisen from similar projects in the past.
A. Identifying the True Extent of the Impacts
Ambiguity in the meaning of "impacts" and potential bias in those
undertaking the assessments complicate the task of evaluating a project's
true effects. Yet the extensive impacts of large infrastructure projects are
undeniable. In the words of the Inter-American Development Bank,
[t]he diverse suite of the IIRSA projects ... makes it imperative
to establish standard techniques for identifying specific project
126. Informaqo Tdcnica No. 34/2006, COHID/CGENE/DILIC/IBAMA, Brasilia, Sept.
11, 2006 (on file with author). See also Pablo Villegas, Destrucci6n de la Amazonia [Destruc-
tion of the Amazon], ADITAL, Sept. 28, 2006, http://www.adital.com.br/site/noticia.asp?
lang=ES&cod=24675.
127. See Tavares, supra note 117; Fdbio Couto, Ibama estima que LP de Rio Madeira
seja concedida at dezembro, AGENCIA CANAL ENERGIA, MEIO AMBIENTE, Sept. 6, 2006,
http://www.canalenergia.com.br/zpublisher/materias/Meio Ambiente.asp?id=55581. Audign-
cias pdblicas in Porto Velho, Rond6nia, held from November 8-11, 2006, were expected to
draw 3,000 people in total and drew 400 people for the November 11 session alone. See
Daniela Chiaretti, ILUMINA, Usinas do Madeira tom a(do ambiental inidita, http://www.
ilumina.org.br/zpublisher/materias/NoticiasComentadas.asp?id=18789; Carolina Derivi, Rio
Madeira - Audigncia piiblica em Porto Velho retoma polemica do EIA, AMAZNIA, Nov. 11,
2006, http://www.amazonia.org.br/noticias/noticia.cfm?id=226264.
128. Tavares, supra note 117 (author's translation).
Kunz avers that the push for development from business interests will not bully
IBAMA into granting licenses prematurely. "For a dam of this scale, there is a risk
of serious accidents if the licensing is conducted irrespective of criteria. IBAMA is
not concerned with pressure [from government or business interests]. We are aware
of the country's need for energy production, but our primary concern is focused on
the possible environmental impacts from a dam of this magnitude and of the dam-
age that the population will suffer"
Id. (emphasis added) (author's translation); See also Faleiros, supra note 7.
Kunz, Jr., of IBAMA, has not set deadlines for the end of evaluations and assures
that there is not any pressure by the government or businesses to approve the pro-
ject. "Any project like this one, with impacts in a sensitive area, needs to be
evaluated with caution in order not to have an environmental disaster."
Id. (author's translation).
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components, social and environmental issues of concern and
provisions for addressing such matters during the planning and
implementation of hubs, groups of projects and individual pro-
jects. From an IDB perspective, there are corporate risks
regarding potential sponsorship or endorsement of unsustainable
initiatives. Consequently, it is advantageous to develop an early
screening methodology that can enhance these important pro-
grams to ensure more sustainable and integrated develop[ment]
[sic] in specific areas and reduce safeguard risks.' 2
9
While the IDB's recognition of the need for thorough assessments is
commendable, it is necessary to explore further the meaning of the term
"impacts." Discrepancies between various interpretations of "impacts"
appear when comparing the content of the EIA to the effects predicted in
other studies of the Rio Madeira projects. Such inconsistencies include
varying accounts of the projects' boundaries and the class of people to be
"affected" by the projects. Further questions arise regarding potential
bias in the EIA and the credibility of information disseminated to the
public about the projects.
A primary source of divergence in the estimation of projected im-
pacts emerges from the definition of the projects' boundaries. IBAMA
staff described the project area as encompassing two dams in Brazil, one
dam in Bolivia, a binational dam, and a hidrovia.'3 ° Beyond these ele-
ments of the complex, in the even broader context of IIRSA, "efficient
highways crossing the Andes must be built, in addition to the infrastruc-
ture projects necessary for river transport."'' 3' Despite this integration, for
licensing purposes Brazil so far has concerned itself only with the
(solely Brazilian) Santo Ant6nio and Jirau dams.' While these two
dams are clearly within Brazil's territorial jurisdiction, Brazil could still
assert rights to regulate the binational dam, for instance, by entering into
129. IDB, Technical Cooperation Program (Trust Fund Financing), TCJFUNDS BRIEF,
IDB TC Doc. RS-T1084, at 2 (Nov. 9, 2004).
130. Interview with Moara Giasson, supra note 95. See also Tavares, supra note 117.
131. ZIBECHI, supra note 3.
132. The process occurs as follows: An interested business contacts IBAMA expressing
its intent to undergo the licensing process. IBAMA creates a team, often together with state
and local environmental ministry personnel, who visits the project area at the business's ex-
pense. IBAMA then develops Terms of Reference, indicating the data expected in the
EIA/RIMA. Next, the party conducts and submits the EIA/RIMA, which IBAMA analyzes,
along with its own diagnostic data procured from its initial site visit, to determine whether
impacts are as minimal as possible. For instance, IBAMA considers details such as treatment
of the affected population, degradation of the environment, preservation of species, and plans
for compensation. If satisfied, IBAMA grants the Licenza Privia. If not, it requests additional
studies. Interview with Moara Giasson, supra note 95.
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a treaty with Bolivia.'33 Such an approach would benefit Brazil in the
long run, as it faces potential liability for damaging effects its activities
cause in other countries.'
34
Like Brazil's government, the business stakeholders among the Ma-
deira project planners display a reluctance to undertake responsibilities
commensurate with the scope of the project. FURNAS has acknowl-
edged the broad implications of the Madeira project, noting that the
"complex includes four hydro plants, two of which are planned in Brazil,
one ... on the Brazil/Bolivia border, and the other ... in Bolivia," add-
ing that "[t]he Madeira project, with its ... waterway extending far
beyond the Brazilian border, will play a major role in a much broader
context than just a national one."'' 35 As a preface to describing the pro-
ject's potential regional benefits, FURNAS asserts that "[t]o prevent, or
at least reduce, environmental degradation, it is imperative to provide
better opportunities for the local population as well as to increase gov-
ernmental intervention by strengthening regional and local
administrative agencies."' 
36
Despite this rhetoric, FURNAS considers environmental analysis of
the entire basin to be the government's responsibility, not its own, be-
cause the projects are not classified collectively under IIRSA 37 if the
government were to solicit a basin-wide assessment, FURNAS would be
the entity charged with that task. As it stands, FURNAS will only evalu-
ate the area that the government requires it to evaluate. The government,
though recognizing the basin-wide implications of the project, has
merely required that FURNAS evaluate the sites of the dam structures
themselves, rather than the entire basin in which those dams will be lo-
cated. Consequently, the government and FURNAS each evade
133. See Verena Glass, Negocia¢do corn Bolivia pode adiar obras de hidrelitrica [Nego-
tiations with Bolivia Could Delay Hydroelectric Works], CARTA MAIOR, Dec. 19, 2006,
http://agenciacartamaior.uol.com.br/templates/materiaMostrar.cfm?materia-id=l 3169 (de-
scribing the binational agreement entered into by Brazil and Bolivia on December 18, 2006,
which created a work group to analyze environmental impacts of the dam complex in both
countries).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (a state's intentional action with substantial effects in another state's territory can pro-
vide a basis for the affected state to assert jurisdiction); Alstr6m & Others v. Comm'n ("Wood
Pulp"), 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (noting that a state's action with direct, substantial, and foreseeable
effects in another state's territory can provide a basis for jurisdiction).
135. FURNAS, supra note 3, at 1, 5.
136. Id. at 6.
137. See Faleiros, supra note 7 ("Furnas considers the request [that it conduct an EIA for
the entire basin] excessive. Mariangela Damberg affirms that there already exists a strategic
environmental assessment that includes the impacts on the Bolivian border. 'The function of
evaluating the entire basin is the government's,' she emphasizes.") (author's translation).
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responsibility for basin-wide assessments by pinning the blame for insuf-
ficient action on each other.
Failing to view these projects collectively produces EIAs of limited
scope, obscuring the projected impacts by chopping them into small,
seemingly insignificant pieces. 3 1 Instead, recognizing that these projects
are interrelated parts of a more extensive whole exposes the true conse-
quences for the region. Members of the Executive Technical Group for
the IIRSA Paraguay-Parand Hub acknowledged this when they "agreed
that the study conducted for the Hub's Business Vision [focusing on the
study of its area of influence] should be enlarged so as to include the
four related sub-basins.' ' 39 Such a shift may serve as useful precedent for
a similar recognition in the Peru-Brazil-Bolivia hub.
Aside from differing interpretations of the project boundaries, ambi-
guity over who is "affected" by the taking of property for the project's
construction seriously frustrates the realization of just and fair compen-
sation. Brazilian law does not define who is "affected" by dams, nor
does it define the extent of impacts of dislocation. 4 0 Construction firms
that fund the EIAs usually end up formulating the definition of "affected
population" by considering only landowners who have official title to the
land.' 4' However, given Brazil's historic practice of granting title primar-
ily to aristocratic landowners regardless of whether they ever actually
occupy the land,' 42 determining who is "affected" based on title-holding
status does not necessarily represent the class of people who deserve
compensation.
Serious discrepancy also exists regarding the anticipated effect on
indigenous peoples. Though the government avers that "there is no
interference with indigenous areas in the entire work area,""14' numerous
other sources disagree. Foremost is the EIA itself, which includes
138. See id. ("In fact, the original Rio Madeira project involved the construction of inter-
national navigation channels, but due to controversy it was decided to license the dams
separately from the waterway. In the EIA, the construction of locks on the Madeira is still
foreseen, but not integration with Bolivia and Peru.") (author's translation).
139. IIRSA, Integration and Development Hubs, Paraguay-Parand Waterway Hub, http://
www.iirsa.org/ejeHidroviaENG.asp?Codldioma=ENG. See also IIRSA, PROJECT PORTFOLIO
2004 add. 5 (2005), available at http://www.iirsa.org/BancoMedios/Documentos%20PDF/
lb05_addendumjlibrojiirsa.pdf.
140. C.F. arts. 5, 182, 184; Eduardo Luiz Zen, Ditadura na Barranca dos Rios
Brasileiros: perseguizdo e crminalizaao de militantes da luta contra as barragens, in REDE
SOCIAL, supra note 68, at 55.
141. Id. at 60-61.
142. JOE FOWERAKER, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND 83-85 (1981).
143. Brazilian Federal Ministry of Transportation, Detailed Information about the
Madeira-Amazonas Hidrovia, 17, available at http://www.transportes.gov.br/bit/hidro/
detriomadeira.htm (last visited July 25, 2006) (author's translation).
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"pressure on indigenous territories" among the cited adverse impacts."
Other data supports the EIA's findings, indicating that "approximately
3,000 indigenous communities are threatened by the proposed
construction of the two hydroelectric dams in the Rio Madeira."'
45
Furthermore, these studies are performed by FURNAS-paid consult-
ants and are therefore susceptible to bias. Brazilian law mandates
independent EIA consultants,' 46 but IBAMA staff acknowledged the po-
tential for bias, noting that the only protection the law truly offers is a
consultant's fear of legal consequences for signing off on the authentic-
ity of altered data. 47 Because this potentially biased data supplies the
content of the EIA and complementary studies, it represents a conserva-
tive assessment of projected impacts and can be considered an objective
minimum in anticipating human rights violations.
The information that FURNAS disseminates to the public should
also be viewed with skepticism. For example, the FURNAS website
states: "Another concern arises in relation to areas that will be flooded.
They will be the same as [the areas flooded during] the annual floods of
the Rio Madeira. That is, the highest water levels will be the same as that
which normally occurs in January.' '148 On its face, this observation does
not sound alarming, but the reality is that the January flood levels will
become permanent. This difference is "like the difference between tak-
ing a bath or living inside the bathtub."' 49 FURNAS' rhetoric illustrates
the need for independent verification of the assessments; simply com-
pleting and submitting studies is insufficient to comply with the overall
objective of the laws requiring EIAs.
Public participation is another area in which the business stake-
holders' portrayal often diverges from reality. In an article describing the
Rio Madeira projects, FURNAS recognized the importance of public
involvement:
144. See FURNAS ET AL., supra note 8 (listing "pressure on indigenous lands" as elev-
enth in the list of medium-level adverse impacts, with a magnitude of ninety-two, where 150
is most severe).
145. Rede Brasil, Comunidades indigenas, ONGs e popula des ribeirinhas discutem em
Porto Velho a proposta de construgdo do Complexo do rio Madeira, 2006, http://
www.rbrasil.org.br/content,0,0,712,0,0.html (author's translation).
146. Resolugdo No. 001/86, art. 7, de 23 de janeiro de 1986, D.O.U. de 17.02.1986
(Brazil) ("The environmental impact study will be conducted by a capable, multidisciplinary
team, neither directly nor indirectly dependent on those behind the project and technically
responsible for the projected results.") (author's translation).
147. Interview with Moara Giasson, supra note 95 (noting that the firms conducting the
EIAs do not necessarily win the projects).
148. FURNAS, supra note 5 (author's translation).
149. Email from Glenn Switkes, Int'l Rivers Network (June 6, 2006) (on file with au-
thor).
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To validate an initiative on the scale of the Madeira complex ...
it was necessary and valuable to bring society into the debate.
The project had undergone public evaluations at several fora,
from meetings with the local people to presentations at interna-
tional symposia and conferences. These debates have greatly
contributed to a comprehensive evaluation of the project's bene-
fits and expected impacts, enhancing knowledge in relation to
the design, gaining public credibility, especially as regards the
local and regional population, and also winning respect from the
South American community.'5°
Such broad claims could contain some truth only if that "commu-
nity" were derived from an unrepresentative sample.'"' More concretely,
this purely retrospective observation seems to presume that the public
need no longer play a role in the ongoing process.
B. Identifying Human Rights Violations Arising from
Impacts of the Rio Madeira Projects
Both the EIA and other studies confirm that projected impacts span
social, economic, political, and environmental elements, among others.
As noted above, the Inter-American Court has found that human rights
violations may arise from neglect of a state's duty to respect and guaran-
tee human rights along with violations of specific rights. Past recognition
of violations by the Inter-American Court and other human rights tribu-
nals suggests a similar result would emerge in the case of the Rio
Madeira.
1. Impacts on Society, Property, and Adequate Standard of Living
Socio-political impacts of the projects include alteration in the af-
fected population's dynamics, quality of life, and social and political
organization; conflict between the local and migrant populations and
among local fishing populations; and general disruption (intranqiiili-
dade) of the population. In addition, river communities, urban centers,
and the Teot6nio and Amazonas peoples will be compromised. The qual-
ity of the land itself stands to suffer due to occupation of new areas,
pressure on indigenous territories, segmentation of communities, and
loss of agricultural area.'52
150. FURNAS, supra note 3, at 6.
151. Instituto de Desenvolvimento Estratdgico do Setor Energrtico, ONG vai A Justiga
contra audifncias, http://www.ilumina.org.br/zpublisher/materias/NoticiasComentadas.asp?
id=1 8789.
152. FURNAS ET AL., supra note 8.
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On an economic level, aside from loss of agricultural land, the EIA
anticipates loss of investment during the planning and evaluation phases,
and compromised river-community transportation, infrastructure, and
standard of living and wellbeing.' Moreover, the EIA shows that the
dam projects will result in fewer jobs (despite FURNAS's assurances
that "the project will absorb 'all idle labour' near Porto Velho"), a de-
crease in economic activity, and a drop in income for miners.14 Based on
these facts, it is not surprising that the assessment forecasts an increase
in the price of services during construction, as well as increases in de-
mand for public services and subsistence resources.
Project impacts also implicate property rights, as well as the right to
an adequate standard of living. Property rights provide the basis for legal
claims, as project construction will entail occupation of land and expul-
sion of inhabitants. 5 5 As illustrated by the Candonga case, 5 6 dam
projects threaten the ability of affected individuals to support an ade-
quate standard of living, security of tenure, provision of services,
habitability, accessibility, adequate localization, and cultural adequacy.
Similarly situated victims in Rio Madeira could bring challenges under
the right to an adequate standard of living. Furthermore, as the right to
water is a logical offshoot of the right to an adequate standard of liv-
ing,' 7 contamination of river water related to the dam projects may lay
the basis for an adequate standard of living claim.
2. Impacts on Health and Life
Direct threats to health include increases in mortality rates, machine
and vehicular accidents, and risk of accidents with poisonous animals.
158
Other adverse health impacts stem from likely increases in the incidence
of malaria and other diseases; increase in metals, such as mercury, and
non-metals in sediment; and poorer air quality. "'
Given the impacts noted in the EIAs, victims in Rio Madeira, like
those in the Yanomami case, could prevail in claiming violations of the
right to health or right to life.' 60 However, the difficulty in proving causa-
tion for death or even for nonfatal harm arising from adverse impacts to
health highlights the need for unassailable documentation in order to
153. Id.
154. The Americas: Damned If You Do, ECONOMIST, June 3, 2005, at 60.
155. See FURNAS ET AL., supra note 8.
156. See JUSTI A GLOBAL ET AL., supra note 9, at 70-71.
157. See supra Section III.A.
158. FURNAS ET AL., supra note 8.
159. Id.
160. Yanomami v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/85, OAS/Ser.L/
VIII.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985) (under the "Resolves" section of the opinion).
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succeed in such claims. If forced relocation results in death to victims,
the Brazilian state could be held liable for complicity in murder, as it
was in Corumbiard.1
6
3. Impacts on the Natural Environment
According to the EIA, among the impacts on the natural environ-
ment are deforestation; loss of habitat (including reproductive habitat);
interference with migration and species reproduction; loss of biodiver-
sity, including numerous negative effects on flora and fauna; change in
pH and ionic concentration of water; introduction of new species; and
increase in sediment and erosion. 6 Other studies note that construction
of the Rio Madeira dams will occur in a
region of great importance for biodiversity ... affect[ing] ap-
proximately 700 species of fish and 800 species of birds ... as
well as isolated indigenous tribes that lack contact with society
... [and are] not included in the Ministry of the Environment's
environmental impact studies used for the environmental licens-
ing process.1
63
If and when the right to a healthy environment attains force in interna-
tional or domestic tribunals, petitioners would have substantial grounds
to bring claims challenging the protection of that right.
4. Impacts on Indigenous Peoples
Given the Rio Madeira project sites' proximity to indigenous peo-
ples' lands, the likelihood that the construction of dams and other
infrastructure projects will cause the expulsion of these people is dis-
tressingly high. Despite assurances from FURNAS, IBAMA, and the
Brazilian Federal Ministry of Transportation that indigenous peoples will
not be affected by the Rio Madeira projects,'4 the BIA explicitly indi-
cates otherwise, listing "pressure on indigenous territories" among the
adverse impacts. 65 Aside from the EIA, other sources evaluating the im-
pacts have determined that the projects will adversely affect indigenous
peoples. 66 Infant mortality, suicide, murder, attempted murder, death
161. Corumbiar v. Brazil, Case 11.556, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 32/04,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. (2004).
162. FURNAS ET AL., supra note 8.
163. Rede Brasil, supra note 145 (author's translation).
164. Interview with FURNAS staff, supra note 35; Interview with Moara Giasson, supra
note 95; Brazilian Federal Ministry of Transportation, supra note 143 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., AMBIENTE BRASIL, supra note 95.
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threats, sexual violence, and violence against cultural heritage all have
arisen from past dam construction near indigenous communities.
67
According to Zacarias of the indigenous tribe Gavido, the con-
struction of hydroelectric dams directly affects indigenous
reserves, flooding tropical forests, such that the indigenous peo-
ples will lose their heritage. "There are traditional cemeteries
that preserve the history of the indigenous peoples, archeological
areas that were not studied, all of which will be destroyed, leav-
ing us with no future."'68
In light of the Mayagna and Yanomami cases, indigenous peoples
would have viable claims under the right to land, but they would not
succeed in discrimination claims. 69 Even if the claims are not fully adju-
dicated, Enxet-Lamenxay and Lhaka Honhat suggest that friendly
settlements in such cases would recognize indigenous rights.7°
Based on facts established by EIAs and other supplementary impact
assessments, as well as violations recognized by various international
tribunals, the potential for human rights violations from the Rio Madeira
projects is high. This potential indicates the need to take the full range of
impacts into account as the projects proceed through the licensing proc-
ess and implementation phase.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of outlining the applicable rights and the potential ways
they will be violated is not to advocate a reactive approach but to en-
courage preventive steps to avert such violations. The legal system
recognizes the violation of these rights, but past practice indicates it is
likely that these violations will recur. As a result, prudent planners
should take this information into account and proceed with planning and
167. Paulo Maldos, Inventdrio de uma infamia - Violncia contra os povos indigenas no
Brasil, in REDE SOCIAL, supra note 68, at 77, 77-83 (recounting impacts on the Guarani-
Kaiowd people in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul).
168. Rede Brasil, supra note 145 (author's translation).
169. See Yanomrnami v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R, Report No. 12/85, OAS/
Ser.L/V/ll.66, doc. 10 rev. (1985); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001); Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand,
Commc'n. No. 547/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/70/D/547/1993 (2000).
170. See Enxet-Lamenxay & Kayleyphapopyet (Riachito) Indigenous Communities v.
Paraguay, Case 11.713, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 90/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev.
(1999); CEJIL, Desafios do Sistema Interamericano na Prote(iio do DESC Perante a Co-
missdo Interamericana [Challenges of the Inter-American System in the Protection of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights before the Inter-American Commission], CEJIL GA-
ZETA, 2001, No. 12, at 2, available at http://www.cejil.org/gacetas/cejill2b.pdf.
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implementation of projects in a manner that will respect and protect in-
dividuals' guaranteed human rights.
Past cases and current projections of impacts arising from the Rio
Madeira projects indicate serious potential for violations of the rights to
life, health, a healthy environment, and an adequate standard of living, as
well as indigenous people's rights. Liability for this harm will arise in-
dependently of whether an EIA accurately predicted such impacts. Yet
tools like ElAs can minimize the negative effects by evaluating impacts
and informing construction in a way that will decrease harm. In the case
of the Rio Madeira projects, the failure of the current EIA to account for
the full geographic scope of the projects' effects demonstrates a need for
a broader assessment, as many negative impacts will escape detection
under a purely local lens.
Because Brazil's national legislation establishes legal obligations to
uphold human rights, the national courts may be a first point of adjudica-
tion should the dam projects proceed and produce the anticipated effects.
However, should national courts fail to provide adequate protection, the
Inter-American system has demonstrated its willingness to hear such
claims. Moreover, if the government (through state entities like
FURNAS or agencies like IBAMA) causes the harm, petitioners could
satisfy the requirement of exhausting domestic remedies and thereby
avail themselves of the Inter-American forum from the outset. Taking
into account the gravity of harm to be expected from adverse impacts of
infrastructure projects, along with the jurisprudence of human rights tri-
bunals, the objective of avoiding human rights violations necessitates
planning that reflects the true scope of the project area and its impacts.
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